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HABEAS CORPUS: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE
Alan Clarke

I. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF HABEAS HISTORY
The modem U.S. debate over habeas history' is about the proper
scope of the writ of habeas corpus; to what extent should a federal habeas
court be able to review and overturn state prisoner claims of unlawful
imprisonments? The history of habeas corpus is relevant because the
controversy is premised, in part, on the historical limits to the scope of
habeas corpus. The question is: to what extent ought those limits continue
to confine the Great Writ now?
Proponents of an expansive scope for the writ' and those who

'See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
(1980); Gary Peller, In Defense ofFederalHabeasCorpusRelitigalion, 16 HARV. C.R. - C.L.
L. REv. 579 (1982).
2 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Justice Brennan's majority opinion is the
basis for an expansive scope of habeas review. This model views the historic function of the writ
to have been the release of persons detained in violation of fundamental laws. As constitutional
protections expanded to the states through the due process clause, habeas was available as a
remedy. According to this hypothesis, the scope of habeas did not change, but remained constant
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would circumscribe, if not eviscerate, habeas review,3 generally premise
their positions on: (1) radically opposing views of the history of habeas
corpus, and (2) radically different views of the institutional relations
between state and federal governments4 (particularly where the
appropriateness of federal judicial oversight of the state criminal process

as the miethod to effect release from any confinement that violated fundamental law. Only the
fundamental law changed through expansion of federally protected rights made applicable to the
states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees. See also
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (containing a history of the doctrine of
incorporation). Recent scholarship tends to support a modified version of the Brennan/Peller
thesis. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler, DemodelingHabeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575, 576 (1993);
James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack On Habeas
Corpus/DirectReview Parity,92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997 (1992).
' Paul M. Bator, Finality in.CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners,76 HARv.L. Rnv. 441 (1963) (arguing that until recently federal habeas review of
state criminal .cases was limited to jurisdictional questions which expanded slightly in the early
twentieth century to redress institutional failures such as the failure to provide a fair hearing
process). Professor Bator viewed the expansion of habeas corpus after the Civil War as a
softening of the concept of jurisdiction rather than an expansion of the scope of the writ.
According to this theory, the courts can never guarantee error-proof results in criminal trials.
Thus, habeas corpus existed merely to ensure that the process was fair. This would not allow
federal relitigation of either legal or factual issues determined in the state criminal process where
the prisoner had a reasonable opportunity to assert them in the state forum. Professor Bator's
article preceded Fay v. Noia by a few months and was, according to Bator, "pronounced dead
almost as soon as it was written, only to enjoy a mysterious recent resurrection." See Paul M.
Bator, The State Courtsand FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605
(1981). The Bator thesis was most recently defended by Justice Thomas in Wright v. West, 112
S.Ct. 2482 (1992). Other scholars have attacked the Brennan historical thesis without going so
far as to conclude that Fay v. Noia was wrongly decided. See, e.g., Lewis Mayers, The Habeas
CorpusAct of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Ci. L. R~v. 31(1965);
Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court - HabeasCorpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451
(1966).
4 In addition to the Brennan/Peller "constitutional" model and the "process" model
espoused by Professor Bator, Judge Henry J. Friendly, argued that innocence ought to be the
prime criterion for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant?CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI.L. REv. 138 (1970). This
model explicitly adopts Bator's historical thesis but emphasizes the guilt/innocence function of
habeas corpus rather than process. Id. See also IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS,
Chap. 3 (1994) (giving a clear and succinct exposition of all three models for habeas corpus
review).
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is involved). These divergent views of the history of habeas corpus have
erupted into acrimonious debate even among some of the more
conservative members of the U.S. Supreme Court.' This paper focuses on
the historical debate showing how and why modem interpretations of the
historical development of the writ help frame, and have practical
consequences for, the current debate over the proper scope of the writ of
habeas corpus.

II. THE ENGLISH ORIGINS OF HABEAS CoRPUS
A. Medieval Developments

Blackstone6 and Coke7 traced habeas corpus to the Magna Carta;
however, there is little relationship between Magna Carta' and habeas
corpus.' Perhaps the most that can be said is that the writ Blackstone
called the "glory of the English law"'" arose from "humble and obscure

Compare Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482 (1992) with Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct.
2482, 2493 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMiMENTARIEs *131.
7

Id. at *133; See also 2 COKE INSTITUTEs *52-53.

8

Clause 39 of the Magna Carta (1215, cl. 39; 1225, c.29) prohibited imprisonment,
disseisin, outlawry, or exile "except by lawful judgment." This applied solely to freemen, not
villeins, and failed to provide any remedy for violation of these rights. See J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 537-38 (3d ed. 1990).
9DUKER, supra note 1, at 45 (commenting on the debates in the House of Commons

in 1628: "The Commons argued that the writ of habeas corpus was an instrument springing
naturally and inevitably from the Magna Carta. But the legislators, especially Coke,.were
certainly aware that the statutory and case history hardly compelled the conclusion they were
arguing for. Indicative of this awareness was their rejection of the King's offer merely to reaffirm
these statutes.") (citations omitted) Cohen, Some Considerationson the Origins of Habeas
Corpus, 16 CAN. B. REV. 92,94 (1938) (stating "now it is generally agreed-that there was in fact
no strict connection between the writ and Magna Carta."). Similarly, J.H. Baker accepts that
habeas corpus was not a "part of the original intent" of the Magna Carta. See, e.g., BAKER, supra
note 8, at 538. See also, W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 111-12 (3d. ed.
1925).
10 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *133.
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origins in medieval England.""
Habeas corpus originated as a prerogative writ of the Crown 2
whose purpose "was firmly established by 1230'" as a procedural writ to
bring people - such as jurors or witnesses - before the court so that the
judiciary could conduct its business.' 4 Thus, habeas corpus began as a
means of getting people into court, 5 not out of confinement. In the
fourteenth century courts started to entertain habeas proceedings initiated
by the prisoner (as opposed to the court) and which (when coupled with
another writ such as certiorari) questioned the cause of incarceration. 6
This "first use of the writ to challenge imprisonment was in cases of
privilege."' 7 In that era classes of people - such as clergy, members of
Parliament, ministers of the King, and officers of the central courts - were
privileged in that they "were above the ordinary mechanisms and process
of the legal system."' 8 The Norman Conquest had superimposed a
centralized court system onto the multitudinous extant local and manorial
courts.'9 Habeas corpus restrained the jurisdiction of inferior or special
courts,2" and released the privileged office holders from imprisonment,2'
for trial in their own central courts.2 Thus, the writ's maturation into
liberties' writ commenced as the superior central court's instrument to
protect their jurisdiction against encroachment by inferior local or

1

Robert J. Sharpe, A ConstitutionalHistory of Habeas Corpus, 1982 PUBLIC LAW
154 (1982) (book review).
'2 See S.A. DeSmith, The PrerogativeWrits, 11 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40 (1951) (giving
an excellent discussion of the nature and development of the prerogative writs).
13DUKER, supra note 1, at 17.
14See, e.g., HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 108-09.
Is BAKER, supra note 8, at 168.

16DUKER, supra note 1, at 31.
SBAKER, supra note 8, at 168.
'8 DUKER, supra note 1, at 31.
'9 Id. at 14.
20Maxwell Cohen, HabeasCorpus Cum Causa - The Emergence of the Modern
Writ-I, 18 CAN. B. REv. 10, 16 (1940).
21BAKER, supra note 8, at 168.
22
DUKER, supra note 1, at 31.
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manorial tribunals.23 Jurisdictional disputes between courts, and the
protection of feudal privilege, not liberty or human rights, propelled this
evolution.
B. FurtherDevelopment: Habeas Corpus and the Victory of the
Common Law Courts
Rivalry between these central courts" erupted in the late fifteenth
century. The common law courts first challenged the Court of Chancery,
and then proceeded to challenge, and ultimately dominate, the other
central courts.26 Habeas corpus's ability to trump the jurisdictional
encroachment of other tribunals made it the ideal weapon in this new
conflict. The unintended beneficiary of these jurisdictional disputes was
a further expanded role for habeas corpus.
The common law court's use of habeas corpus to protect and
extend their authority is illustrated in Glanville v. Courtney.27 Glanville
obtained a judgment before the Kings Bench on an action on a bond for
the non-payment of some jewels. The defendant, Courtney, procured an
order from the Court of Chancery staying proceedings at law, thus
preventing Glanville from executing his judgment. Glanville defied the
stay, was held in "contempt in not performing the order" and was
"committed to the Fleet,"28 by the Lord Chancellor. The King's Bench
released him on a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Coke said in ruling:
"[w]e will not suffer our judgments to be shaken, in other English Courts,
the Lord Chancellor hath now said in the Chancery, that he will not

"See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 8, at 168.
In addition to the common law courts (Kings Bench and Common Pleas) the most
prominent central courts in this battle were the Court of Chancery, the Court of the High
Commission, the Court of Admiralty, the Court of Requests, and the Court of Exchequer. The
Kings Bench was referred to as the Upper Bench during.the interregnum.
25HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 110-11.
"See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 20, at 20-25.
"80 Eng. Rep. 1139 (K.B. 1615).
"Id. at 1139. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that
The Fleet was "a prison in London (so called from a river or ditch formerly in its vicinity)").
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meddle there, in matters, after judgements given at the common law."29

The Lord Chancellor re-committed Glanville, who again moved for a writ
of habeas corpus and was againreleased. 0 This case demonstrates: (1)
the growing power of the common law courts, and (2) the rapidly
expanding scope of the writ of habeas corpus. In this way, the superior
central courts triumphed over the local courts, and in turn the common
law courts protected and extended their authority at the expense of-the
other superior courts. Habeas corpus was ready for its next evolutionary
stage: the battle against executive tyranny.
C. Habeas Corpus Develops Into the Writ of Liberty
The Stuart's drive toward absolutism during the seventeenth
century collided head-on with the rising power of both Parliament and the
Courts. Habeas corpus provided the fulcrum that leveraged Parliament
and the Courts into undoing the monarchy's autocratic assertion of power.
It was a history that later provided the revolutionaries who forged the
United States with powerful propaganda.3 1
During the reign of Elizabeth 1 (1558-1603) the last of the House
of Tudor, William Search sought and received release on a writ of habeas
corpus despite having violated letters patent issued by the Queen.32
Although "[t]he court seemed to be denying the Queen the power to

29Glanville, 80 Eng. Rep. at 1139:
30

Similarly, in The King and Dr. Gouge, the Court of the King's Bench held that: "It
would tend to the downfall of the common law, ifjudgements here given, should be suffered to
be called in question in Courts of Equity." 81 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1615).
"' See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 1, at 115 (noting that "In attempting to secure the
loyalty ofQuebec to their cause, the American Congress on 21 October 1774 addressed a letter
to Great Britain decrying the... [to extend] the Habeas Corpus Act to Quebec:'.. . [w]e cannot
help deploring the unhappy condition to which it has reduced the many British settlers, who,
encouraged by the royal proclamation, promising the enjoyment of all their rights, have
purchased estates in that country. - They are now the subjects of an arbitrary government,
deprived of trial by jury, and when imprisoned, cannot claim the benefit ofthe habeascorpus
act, that great
bulwark and palladium of English liberty."') (citations omitted).
32
DUKER, supra note 1, at 42.
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imprison by letters patent,"33 Search's Case3 4 was the exception that
proved the rule; The Crown, through the entire Privy Council, retained the
power to commit per speciale mandatum 5 The. challenge to executive
power did not touch the core of the Crown's political power, nor did it yet
directly involve Parliament.
The perennially impecunious Charles I, the second reigning
monarch from the House of Stuart, ascended to the British throne in 1625.
Since Parliament was generally uncooperative, he sought to finance his
unpopular foreign adventures through forced loans. The King dissolved
parliament, but without their assent he could not raise the taxes necessary
to finance the unpopular war with Spain (and by 1626, France as well).
The stratagem of a forced loan, not surprisingly, proved unpopular.36
More than seventy knights and gentlemen who had refused to contribute
were arrested,37 but only five sought habeas corpus.3" Ironically, Sir
Thomas Darnel, who gave his name to the case, lost his nerve, and
withdrew his habeas corpus. 9 The four remaining prisoners went
forward. Their barristers (who were prominent in the seventeenth century
bar40 ) argued that the return stated no cause of imprisonment. One

33

Id. at 43.

34 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (C.P. 1588).
" DUKER,

supra note 1, at 43 (stating that per speciale mandatum means by special

order).

16This theme was echoed in another century and another continent when the British
colonists in North America protested the Stamp Act crying "no taxation without representation."
George I,of the House of Hanover, proved no more sensitive to this issue than his Stuart
predecessor Charles I, although George, at least, did manage to keep his head.

3 ENCYCLOPAEDIABRITANNICA 112-13 (1993).
Darnel's Case, 3 State. Trials 1 (1627) (stating that the five prisoners who brought
their habeas corpus were "sir Thomas Darnel, sir John Corbet, sir Walter Earl, sir John
Heveningham, and sir Edmund Hampden.").
39
1d. at 4-5.
40See A.W.B. SIPsON, BIOGRAPIncAL DICTONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 73 (1984)
37
3

(giving a prominent biography of Sir John Bramston); id. at 389-90 (biography of William Noy
(Noye)); id. at 470-71 (biography of John Selden). Their opponent, the Attorney General, Sir
Id. at 233. See
Robert Heath, is described as "[a] learned and able constitutional lawyer .
also Id. at 153 (stating that Sir John Doddridge is described as ';a,scholarly cultured man"); 3

State Trials at 31 (where Justice Doddridge exclaimed aptly: "This is the greatest cause that ever
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counsel argued, among other things:
[I]f this return shall be good, then his imprisonment shall
not continue on for a time, but for ever; and the subjects
of this kingdom may be restrained of their liberties
perpetually, and by law there can be no remedy for the
subject: and therefore this return cannot stand with the
laws of the realm, or that ofMagna Charta; . . . "
The Attorney General responded that only the King was in a position to
judge such matters, that the courts and its officers could not "examine
matters of state, to which we are not born." 42 Chaffee has interpreted this
argument as contending "that the King's silence about his reasons for
imprisoning a man simply meant that it would endanger the state for him
to make those reason public."43
The knights lost. At this point habeas was effective against certain
deprivations of liberty, but the courts - even the King's Bench - could not

challenge the King or the combined Privy Council. The knight's ordeal
was not lost on the members of the prorogued parliament. The Kings
financial distress forced him to convene parliament" which promptly
reversed the rule in Darnel's Case by requiring the King or Council to
state the cause of detentions ordered by them."5 This act notwithstanding,

I knew in this court.").
41 See Darnel's Case, 3 State Trials at 8 (statements made by Sej. Bramston)
(emphasis added). Mr. Selden echoed the argument springing from the Magna Carta stating that
the "law saith expressly, No freeman shall be imprisoned without due process of law; out of this
act of parliament, besides the explanation of other statutes, it appears, 'Nullus liber homo
capiaturvel imprisonaturnisiper legem terr."'" Id. at 18.
42
Darnel'sCase, 3 State Trials at 44-45.
43
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32
B.U.L. REv. 143, 156 (1952).
" DUKER, supra note 1, at 44.
45See 3 Car. 1, § 5 (providing "Nevertheless against the tenor of the said statutes..
divers of your subjects have of late been imprisoned without any cause shewed."). See also 3
Car. 1, § 10 (3) (further providing "that no freeman, in any such manner as is before-mentioned,
be imprisoned or detained.").
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habeas continued to prove ineffective against the full Privy Council.46
In 1640, 47 Parliament again examined habeas corpus in relation to
the King, his Privy Council, and the Court of the Star Chamber. As a
result, the Star Chamber was "clearly and absolutely dissolved, taken away
and determined."48 But the most important part of this legislation (known
as the Habeas Corpus Act of 1641'9) was:
[I]f any person shall hereafter be committed ...by the

command or warrant of the King... or by the command
or warrant of the council board, or of and of the lords or
others of his majesty's privy council ... have forthwith

granted unto him a writ of habeas corpus.., and the...
[officer] in whose custody the party so committed or
restrained shall... bring or cause to be brought the body
of the said party so committed... in open court...5 and
shall... certify the true cause of such his detainer: 0
Thus, the common law courts were given the clear power to inquire into
the causes of imprisonment and order release if sufficient cause were
lacking, even where the King or Privy Council had ordered the detention.
After the Restoration", and Charles I's ascension to the British
throne on May 29, 1660, "more serious defects" in the writ were
disclosed.52 Bushell's Case53 and Jenke's Case54 provide contrasting
46Cohen, supra note 20, at 42.
47

Charles I had again suspended Parliament in 1629 and did not reconvene it until the
Long Parliament convened at Westminster in 1640. The period between parliaments is known
as "the eleven years of tyranny" and it is this period that led to the civil war that began in 1642.
The history of habeas corpus was undoubtedly affected by the turmoil of the time.
48 16 Car. 1, ch.10, § 2.
49
See 16 Car. 1, ch. 10, § 8. See also DUKER, supra note 6, at 47.
5016 Car.l, ch. 10, § 8.
51
Although the interregnum (1649-1660) brought liberal expansion of habeas corpus
for the relief of poor debtors "when it came to political matters the Lord Protector and his council
of State were no more sympathetic toward the use of the habeas corpusad subjiciendum..:.
than had been King Charles or his Privy Council before them." See Cohen, supra note 20, at
177.

384

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XlV

examples of the writ's utility prior to the most notable of all habeas statutes
- the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679." 5

Bushell's Case56 is often cited, not only for its part in the history
of habeas corpus, but also for the power of the jury to find the facts even
where the law is thereby nullified.f 7 Bushell's Case arose out of the trial
of William Penn and William Meade for "trespasses, contempts, unlawful
assemblies and tumults."" Penn and Meade apparently were guilty of little
more than preaching Quaker tenets to a.crowd 9 The authorities charged
Penn and Meade with tumultuous assembly. Without counsel, Penn and
Meade defended brilliantly. Refused. a copy of the indictment, and
required to plead, William Penn responded:
I am unacquainted with the formality of the law, and
therefore before I shall answer directly, I request two
things of the court. 1. That no advantage may be taken
against me, nor I deprived of any benefit which I might
otherwise have received. 2. That you will otherwise
promise me a fair hearing, and liberty of making my
defence.60
The Court responded: "No advantage shall be taken against you, you shall
have liberty; you shall be heard."6
The jurors returned their verdict:
s2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 115.

84 Eng. Rep. 1123, 6 State Trials 999 (C.P. 1670). Bushell's name is also spelled
"Bushel" in the reports.
14 6 State Trials 1189 (1676).
" 31 Car2, ch. 2.
16 6 State Trials 999 (1670).
" See, e.g., Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, JuryNullification andJury-ControlProcedures,
65 N.Y.U.L. REv. 825, 829-30 (1990) (noting that Bushell's case is frequently compared with
the equally famous trial in the colony of New York in 1735 of John Peter Zenger).
" Bushell's Case, 6 State Trials at 1001.
59
See 6 State Trials 951 (1670).
60
Id.at 955.
61
id.
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do find William Penn to be Guilty of

speaking or preaching to an assembly, met together in
Gracechurch-street, the 14th of August last, 1670. And that
William Mead is Not Guilty of the said Indictment ....
Obser. This both Mayor and Recorder resented at so high
a rate, that they exceeded the bounds of all reason and
civility.
Mayor. What, will you be led by such a silly fellow as
Bushel? an impudent canting fellow? I warrant you, you
shall come no more upon juries in haste: You are a
foreman indeed, addressing himself to the foreman, I
thought you had understood your place better.
Recorder. Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we
have a verdict that the court will accept; and you shall be
locked up, without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall
not think thus to abuse the court; we will have a verdict, by
the help of God, or you shall starve for it.62
With the juror Bushel in the jail, habeas corpus provided the
remedy. Chief Justice Vaughn supplied the lofty rhetoric: "The Writ of
habeas corpus is now the most usual remedy by which a man is restored
again to his liberty, if he have been against law deprived of it."63 Bushel
was released and both habeas corpus and the independence of juries had
been advanced.
If habeas corpus proved effective for William Penn, its defects

62

Id.at 963.

'Bushell's Case, 6 State Trials at 1002 (emphasis added). See also 124 Eng. Rep.
1007.
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glared in the case of Francis Jenkes in 1676.64 The licentious King,
Charles II, had acknowledged fourteen children, 65 but had no legitimate

heir to the throne. He was suspected of being pro-French and proCatholic (he later converted to Catholicism). The heir apparent - his
brother James - had converted to Catholicism. The unpopular Dutch war
had ended in the Declaration of Indulgence which had driven all Roman
Catholics, including brother James, from office. By 1675 even the houses
of Parliament were embroiled in bitter dispute, which the King resolved
by terminating the parliamentary session.6 6 Suspending the Parliament,

while perhaps practical from Charles's viewpoint, was unpopular,
particularly with the merchants of London whose trade was being

sabotaged by what they perceived to be Charles's pro-French policies.
Francis Jenkes, along with many other merchants, felt that the King's illadvised policies required "a more speedy redress than a Parliament

prorogued for fifteen months could afford."67 Jenkes spoke out publicly
at a large meeting run by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London.
Jenke's intemperate language,68 however, was not the cause of his
difficulties. His crime was in calling for a new parliament - a call that

"Jenke's Case, 6 State Trials 1190 (1676). Chafee parallels Jenke's Case and
Darnel's Case with enforcement of the McCarran Act in World War 1Iwhich, while not
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, "authorized the detention (during a war or proclaimed
emergency) of persons who are not charged with having committed any crime, simply because
the President or the Attorney General rules that they would probably engage in spying or
sabotage." See Chafee, supra note 43, at 160.
653 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 113-14 (1993).
DuKIER, supra note 1, at 56.
67
Jenke's Case, 6 State Trials at 1189.
68Jenkes stated:
[T]he general decay of trade, if not remedied, as must unavoidably bring
the whole city to poverty and ruin: and it is conceived, that this is very
much occasioned by the French, who have laid such great impositions
upon our woollen cloth, stuffs and other manufactures, that we have
almost lost our trade with France. They have spoiled our trade with
Holland, Flanders, and Germany, by a destructive war. They have ruined
our trade at home, and beggared many thousands of our honest and
industrious weavers, and other English manufacturers and traders...
See Id. at 1189.
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provoked "the greatest part of the assembly" to cry out "'[w]ell moved,
well moved."'69
Later that day, "the Recorder, Sir John Howel, out of a great
pretence of loyalty, but indeed a personal grudge against Mr. Jenkes,
conveyed the news to Whitehall."7" The next day Jenkes found himself
before the King and his Council. Asked to respond, Jenkes replied
impertinently: "I desire to know if this be all you have to charge against
me?"'" Jenkes continued to respond in the same vein, refusing to tell who,
if anyone, had put him up to it, thus incurring the ire of the entire
assembly.72

Jenkes was imprisoned. Two days later he cadged a copy of the
warrant which charged that he:
did, on the 24th of... June ... in a most seditious and

mutinous manner, openly move and stir the persons then
present,

. . .

to call a new parliament. And ... Jenkes,

being now called in, and heard before his majesty in
council, was so far from denying or extenuating his
offence, that he did in a presumptuous and arrogant
manner endeavour to justify the same ......
His crime was doubtful, "and in any event, his offense was slight enough
to be bailable, but what good did that do him? 7 4 Jenkes sought habeas
corpus repeatedly all summer, but no court (regardless of its view of the
merits) had the courage to release him. Part of the problem was that the'
courts were by then in recess and no longer had the power to issue writs
of habeas corpus. As Chafee tells the story:

69
70
71

1d. at 1191.
Id. at 1192.
1d.

2Jenke's Case, 6 State Trials at 1194 (noting how Jenkes drove several lords and the
King to ask numerous questions in disbelief of the answers Jenkes provided).
"Id. at 1195.
74Chafee, supranote 43, at 149.
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Summer was well along by now, and Jenckes [sic]
resolved to sit still until the term of court began at the end
of September. Before then, however, Lord Nottingham
and the Chief Justice unexpectedly became ashamed of
themselves. They told the King that Jenckes [sic] had a
plain right to habeas corpus, and Charles let him out. It
comes as no surprise that in 1683 Jenckes [sic] was
convicted for causing another riot in Guildhall and fined
500 marks. But that was long after he had enriched
English liberty by his hot summer in jail.75
At this juncture, the politics of the period serendipitously gave
habeas corpus its biggest boost. By January 1679, England was deeply
embroiled in the almost surely fictitious "Popish plot." Thirty-five
Catholic victims, with Charles's acquiescence, if not approval, went to the
headsman's block. When the Queen and the Earl of Danby were accused
by a runaway parliament in January 1679, Charles dissolved it. The new
Parliament took up a bill to exclude James from the line of succession, and
Charles again prorogued it. 76 But, goaded by regal excesses in cases like
that of Jenkes, Parliament had acted just barely in time for habeas corpus.
On May 26 the Habeas Corpus Act of 16797 passed by two votes; later
that day Charles dissolved the Parliament.
No longer could the King or his Privy council imprison without
cause with impunity. Nor could they ship prisoners beyond the jurisdiction
of the courts to avoid the reach of habeas corpus. Henceforth, gaolers
were required to deliver promptly true copies of the warrant of
commitment (no more laggard responses such as Jenkes suffered were to
be allowed). Those charged with serious crimes had to be speedily tried
or bailed. Writs could be issued in vacation as well as during the term.
Again a problem faced by Jenkes was remedied. Judicial action on each
7 Id. at 150.
76

3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 113-14 (1993).

77 1679,

31 Car. 2, ch. 2.
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writ was required within a precise time frame. Habeas could now
penetrate privileged places. Most of the loopholes that had plagued the
common law writ were now plugged.
D. The Modern Relevance of British Habeas History
What is the importance of this British history of habeas corpus for
twentieth century American jurisprudence? A part of the modem debate
hinges on the question of to what extent did the writ of habeas corpus
provide a remedy for those who were convicted of crime. Bushell's Case
was cited by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia7" for the proposition that
"the nature and purpose of habeas corpus have remained remarkably
constant"'79 in its ability to '!redress detentions in violation of fundamental
law"." ° Fundamental law according to this view becomes analogous to the
due process clause of the Constitution and available the redress of criminal
convictions in violation of fundamental law (due process). The Court
went on to say:
And so, although almost 300 years have elapsed since
Bushell's Case, changed conceptions of the kind of

criminal proceedings so fundamentally defective as to
make imprisonment pursuant to them constitutionally
intolerable should not be allowed to obscure the basic
continuity in the conception of the writ as the remedy for
such imprisonments. 8'
Justice Brennan's majority opinion has been criticized for this
conflation of habeas review of a contempt of court case with habeas
review of criminal convictions generally, because, among other things,
"English courts could exercise a far broader scope of review when

372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Id. at 402.
goId. at 412.
81
Id. at 414.
79
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examining a commitment for contempt than when considering
commitments for treason or felony.""2 Bushell's Case fails to provide a
persuasive precedent for modem U.S. federal habeas corpus review of the
criminal convictions of state prisoners. 3 Our own institutions and history
are more germane to this point. Bushell's Case can properly be cited as
a step in the direction to which the U.S. system ultimately evolved, but
habeas law has not been constant over the last 300 years, and the future
direction of American habeas law was hardly a foregone conclusion in
1670.
The problem for modem American lawyers is not to attempt to
demonstrate that every problem of American habeas law can be traced
directly to British precedent, but to show the gradual evolution of the law
that resulted in the modem writ. The American developments are rich,
and as we will see, support a far richer pedigree for habeas corpus than
that which is enunciated by Justice Thomas in Wright v. West84 which
appears to collapse modem habeas history into the last few years.8 5

82 Oaks,

supra note 3, at 463.

83These limitations on the writ, while subject to debate, as we will see, carried over

the Atlantic into U.S. jurisprudence. See Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830)
(noting that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which came after Bushell's Case, did not apply to
"persons convict or in execution."). See also 1816, 56 Geo. 3, ch. 100, § 3 (discussing how
English courts finally gained the right "to inquire into the Truth of Facts contained in Return").
This subsequent British history gives strength to those who argue that the scope of the writ did
not remain constant over the last 300 years. If the scope of habeas corpus to redress criminal
convictions in violation of fundamental law were so clear it would seem that our British cousins
would have moved in the same direction.
505 U.S. 277 (1992).
s Justice Thomas writes that "Before 1953, however, the inverse of this rule also
remained true: Absent an alleged jurisdictional defect, "habeas corpus would not lie for a [state]
prisoner... if he had been given an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair consideration
of his federal claim in the state courts." See Wright, 505 U.S. at 285 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 459-60 (1963)). See also James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The
AnachronisticAttack on HabeasCorpus/DirectReview Parity,92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997, 201233 (1992) (criticizing Justice Thomas's views).
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III. THE HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The ColonialPeriod
All of the English colonies in North America enjoyed the benefits
of the common law writ of habeas corpus. Of the original thirteen
colonies that ultimately formed the United States, however, only Virginia,
North and South Carolina, and Georgia unequivocally received the
advantages of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.86 In the northern colonies,
only New York even arguably received the Act's benefits. Although
Doctor Duker8 7 concludes that New York citizens were not covered by the
Habeas Corpus Act, the case of Peter Zenger, gives some plausibility to
the argument that New York citizens were protected by the provisions of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.88
Zenger, through his fledgling newspaper, the New York Weekly
Journal, began publishing scathing attacks on Governor Cosby using
"humor, satire, poetry, and almost any other literary device."89 Among
other things, the paper accused Cosby of the "theft of choice Mohawk
Valley real estate."9 The authors of these articles, who were backers of
the paper, included the lawyers William Smith and James Alexander, who
were representing the former acting governor against Governor Cosby.
They were attempting to attack 9' and undercut the authority of Governor
Cosby. And they were successful.
86 DUKER,

supra note 1, at 115. Dr. Duker provides an excellent colony by colony

review ofthe status of habeas corpus prior to the Declaration of Independence, including some
review of cases involving colonies that ultimately formed Canada. Id. He also provides a
synopsis of the various legal theories by which the common law was transplanted into British
North America. Id.
SId. at 111.
8 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2.
89Daniel J. Kornstein, Andrew Hamilton and the Zenger Trial,N.Y.L.J. , Feb. 24,
1984, at 2.
90
William M. Kunstler, The Crown v. John Peter Zenger, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1985,
at 2.
91JULIUS J. MARKE, PeterZenger's Trial,in VIGNETrES OF LEGAL HISTORY 225,229
(1965).
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The Governor aided by his cat's-paw Chief Justice De Lancey,
tried unsuccessfully three times to persuade a grand jury to indict Zenger
for seditious libel.92 Finally, they proceeded upon an information (which
did not require grand jury action) and jailed Zenger pre-trial. Smith and
Alexander sought Zenger's release on a writ of habeas corpus. De Lancey
granted the writ, and on the return day Smith and Alexander "argued that
the return was insufficient."93 In arguing for bail "they cited the Magna
Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill of
Rights."94 De Lancey, however, 95set a prohibitively high bail, and Zenger
spent the next ten months in jail.
Did the granting of the writ followed by a high bail tacitly concede
the applicability of the Habeas Corpus Act? Many lawyers and judges at
the time thought that the Act was applicable. Doctor Duker, however,
points out that the veto of the Charter of Liberties by the Committee on
Trade and Plantations on the ground that the Habeas corpus Act did not
apply to the plantations, probably means that "the benefits of the Habeas
Corpus Act... had no application in New York." 96

Zenger's trial on the merits in August 1735 is often cited for its
analogy to Bushell's Case as an example of jury nullification and as an
advance for jury independence. The case demonstrates how acutely aware
the colonists were of the English struggle for the benefits of habeas
corpus. Zenger's lawyer argued from Bushell's Case,97 and the jury
acquitted despite the Court's adverse rulings on the law.
The Zenger case demonstrates two things about habeas corpus in
Colonial America. First, it shows the limited utility of habeas corpus when
confronted by raw political power. This was particularly true in a colony
that at least arguably lacked the protective penumbra of the Habeas corpus
Act of 1679. Second, no other case better illustrates the colonial bar's

92

Kunstler, supra note 90, at 2.

"' DUKER, supra note 1, at

I 10.

94Id.
9' Kunstler, supra note 90, at 2.
96 DUKER, supra note 1, at 111.
97 MARKF,

supranote 91, at 238.
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understanding of the English struggles over habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus was maturing, but it had yet to evolve into the
modem writ familiar to practitioners. It still did not reach criminal
convictions, and, because (outside of the Southern colonies) the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679 did not apply, many colonists were subjected to
arbitrary detention by royal governors and other officers of the executive

branch. 99

B. The Constitution,Mr. Justice Marshall, andHabeas Corpus
The Articles of Confederation of 1777 proved to be a failure. By
May 1785, a committee of Congress proposed changes. On March 4,
1789, eleven states, including wealthy and politically powerful Virginia,
had ratified the new Constitution, and business under the new form of
government began. Article I, section 9, clause 2 of that Constitution
provided for habeas corpus in curiously negative language - habeas corpus
"shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it. "'00 Did this affirmatively provide for the
writ? Or did it assume that such was already a part of U.S. law via the
common law? Or did it require legislative action? Or was its purpose to
restrain the federal government from abrogating state writs of habeas
corpus? What was its purpose?
Adding to the confusion, Congress soon thereafter passed the
Judiciary Act of 1789101 which purported to give the federal courts and the

Justices of the Supreme Court the power to grant writs of habeas corpus,
but providing:

"' See DUKER, supra note 1, at 95-116 (demonstrating colony by colony the
colonialists desire to have the benefits of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679). See also DUKER,
supra note 1, at 101 (stating "Shortly after the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act (1679),
Cotton Mather recommended that Massachusetts' agents in London attempt to secure for the
citizens of the colony the benefits of the 1679 statute. Without the act, Mather wrote, 'We are
slaves... "') (citations omitted).
99Id. at 95-116.
'ooU.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
o' Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
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That writs of habeas corpus, shall in no case extend to

prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under
or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are

committed for trial before some court of the same, or are
necessary to be brought into court to testify." 2
The last phrase concerning use of the writ to bring witnesses into court
seems clear enough. Habeas corpus had been used for that purpose since
Norman England. But what are we to make of the rest of it? If habeas
corpus was already provided for constitutionally, why was Congress which in 1789 presumably had the Constitutional debates fresh in their
minds - providing for it legislatively? And why was the federal court's
authority limited to persons held under "colour of the authority of the
United States"?" 3 Clearly, Congress did not intend for the federal courts
at this juncture to be able to issue the writ in the case of state prisoners.

Ambiguity and questions pervaded habeas corpus; it would take the courts
to clarify matters.1" 4

Even before Marshall was appointed the fourth Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, habeas corpus had appeared in that
Court,0 5 in its familiar role of testing the sufficiency of a warrant of

02

1

Id.

103
id.

o4Recent scholarship suggests that "the framers intended the [habeas corpus] clause
[of the Constitution] only to restrict Congressional power to suspend state habeas for federal
prisoners." DUKER, supra note 1, at 126. Duker disputes the theory prevalent since Ex Parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), that the habeas corpus clause guaranteed a federal writ
of habeas corpus, albeit limited in scope in that it did not give the federal judiciary habeas review
power over state prisoners. Id. According to Duker, "the framers intended the clause only to
restrict Congressional power to suspend state habeas for federal prisoners." Id. Duker goes on
to point out that until the mid-nineteenth century "a state, as well as a federal, court had authority
to issue a writ ofhabeas corpus to inquire into the imprisonment of a federal prisoner held within
itsjurisdiction." Id. at 149. This thesis, while interesting and plausible, is not the view that the
Supreme Court, under the leadership of John Marshall (1801 to 1835) settled upon. See, e.g.,
Francis Paschal, The Constitution and HabeasCorpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605 (1970).
'0'
United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 17 (1795).
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commitment, and releasing a prisoner on bail, where appropriate. This
was clearly within the intendment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
clarified none of the questions raised by either the Constitution or the
Judiciary Act.
The Supreme Court decided three major habeas cases during John
Marshall's tenure: Ex Parte Burford'06; Ex Parte Bollman and
Swartwoutl°7; and Ex Parte Watkins."°8 Legal scholars °9 continue to
debate the import of these cases.
John Atkins Burford was hauled before "a meeting of many of the
justices of the peace for [Alexandria, Virginia] and.., was required to
find sufficient sureties.., in the sum offour thousand dollars... for his
good behavior .... 11'0 There was no trial, no hearing, no evidence taken.
Only a meeting where the justices of the peace determined that Mr.
Burford was "not ofgood name andfame, nor of honest conversation, but
an evil-doer and disturber of the peace.""' Burford sought habeas corpus
from the Circuit Court which reduced the surety requirement to one
thousand dollars and remanded him to confinement. The Supreme Court
discharged Burford, unanimously holding "that the warrant of commitment
was illegal, for want of stating some good cause certain, supported by
oath.to112

The result in Burford seems unexceptional. The case can be read
at least two ways. On the one hand it reversed what amounted to a
criminal conviction. Thus, it can, with a modest amount of stretching, be
cited for the proposition that the courts would on a habeas corpus reverse
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
108 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
109See, e.g., Paschal, supra note 104, at 605 (arguing that Ex ParteBollman was
wrongly decided); Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 588-96 (arguing that the meaning of
"jurisdiction" was ambiguous inExParteWatkins); Liebman, supra note 2, at 2059 (citing inter
alia Burford,Boilman, and Watkins for the proposition that "paceBator, the 1789 Act cases did
not limit habeas corpus review either to jurisdictional claims or to claims attacking pretrial as
opposed to postconviction detention.").
l' 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 449-50 (emphasis added).
. Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added).
112Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
106

1078
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criminal convictions where a fundamental injustice was evident. 13 On the
other hand, the Court's emphasis on the irregularity of the proceedings," 4
supports those who would argue that habeas corpus existed only to redress
procedural irregularity depriving a court of jurisdiction"' - not individual
injustices regardless of how gross the miscarriage of justice.
The next year, 1807, presented Marshall with one of the more
politically sensitive cases to be found during his long tenure on the high
court. The background is important. In 1807, Marshall's political
nemesis, Thomas Jefferson, was in his second term as President. Jefferson
and Aaron Burr had tied in electoral votes in the election of 1800.
Jefferson had won his first term only because Alexander Hamilton, who
hated Burr even more than he disliked Jefferson, had thrown his support
to Jefferson. By 1807, Aaron Burr had killed Hamilton in a duel, fled New
York, and had become embroiled in a vague conspiracy that may have
involved treason, although it had been discovered and prevented before
there had been any overt act. Burr was acquitted in a trial held in
Richmond, Virginia - presided over by John Marshall. Jefferson heartily
disliked Burr and had publicly condemned him before trial. Marshall, for
his part, had made an ill-advised attempt to subpoena Jefferson. To make
matters worse Marshall had, before trial, attended a dinner where both
Burr and his lawyer had been present. Marshall and Jefferson had been
political antagonists well before these events. This did not improve their
relations.
Eric Bollman and Samuel Swartwout were implicated in the Burr
conspiracy. They had been arrested in New Orleans, where the military
commander had "declared martial law, and refused to regard a writ of
habeas corpus issued by the Supreme Court of New Orleans.""' 6 The
Jefferson Administration, rightly feared that the courts would release
Bollman and Swartwout, and sought to push a secret bill through Congress
'.See Liebman, supra note 2, at 2059-60 n. 355 and accompanying text.
..See 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 453 (noting that the lower court should "take care that
their proceedings are regular.").
1S The word "jurisdiction" here is used in its narrow sense, where a court has the
parties properly before it and has power over the subject matter in controversy.
"6DUKER, supra note 1, at 135.
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stripping the courts of habeas jurisdiction for three months. That effort
succeeded in the Senate but foundered in the House of Representatives." 7
Bollman and Swartwout, rebuffed by the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia (to which jurisdiction they had been transported)
sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall,
"undoubtedly enjoyed embarrassing""' Jefferson. Speaking for a three to
one majority" 9 Marshall ruled that the Congress had a constitutional
obligation to make the writ of habeas corpus available (except in the case
of state prisoners). 20 He found the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to be
appellate in nature, such that it could review and revise the lower court's
ruling.' 2' On the merits, Marshall decided "that the crime of treason
should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases."' 2 2 He
proceeded to find that "as the crime with which the prisoners stand
charged has not been committed, the court can only direct them to be
discharged."' 2 3 The Boliman case supports those who argue that as early
as the immediate post-colonial period the Supreme Court used habeas
corpus beyond merely testing a lower court's jurisdiction. In Bollman, the
"issuing court had jurisdiction. 24

.7 Id. at 135-37.
8
I at 137.
ld.
19 See Ex ParteBollman and Swartout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93 n. *. Associate
Justices Washington and Livingston joined Marshall's opinion, whereas Johnson dissented, and
Cushing and Chase "were prevented by ill health from attending." Id. Johnson's opinion stated
his dissent was "supported by... one of my brethren, who is prevented by indisposition from
attending." Id. at 107.
120 See Paschal, supra note 104, at 607 (noting that the author takes issue with
Marshall's conclusion that Congress had the power to exclude state prisoners from the ambit of
federal habeas corpus). Paschal's thesis "is that in the case of habeas corpus congressional
authorization is not essential ... It is that the Constitution's habeas clause is a directive to all
superior courts of record, state as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely
available." Id. Paschal's thesis is diametrically opposed to Dr. Duker's thesis which has it that
the habeas clause in the Constitution only served to prevent Congress from trenching on the
right of the states to make habeas corpus available to federal prisoners.
1218 U.S. (4 Cranch) at
101.
22
1 Id. at 127.
123
Id. at 136.
124Liebman, supranote 2, at 2059 n. 354.
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The law, as expressed by Marshall, failed to hold still for this
thesis, as the habeas case Ex Parte Watkins demonstrates. 2 5 Watkins had
been tried and convicted in the lower federal court. He complained that
the court lacked jurisdiction because the indictment failed to state an
offense. Justice Marshall might have decided the case on narrow grounds.

The Court could have declined to intervene in what could have been
characterized as a conviction procured under indictments that, far from
being void, merely contained technical errors. The lower court's error, if
any, might have been viewed as minor and harmless. The Court, speaking
through Marshall, did not adopt that approach.
It pointed out that the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction
in criminal cases. 2 6 The Court felt that "it would be strange, if, under
colour of a writ [of habeas corpus] ... we could substantially reverse a
judgment which the law has placed beyond our control."' 27 The Court
refused to do indirectly through habeas corpus what Congress had
forbidden directly through the courts ordinary appellate procedures.
Marshall did not stop there. He went on to say that "[j]udgments rendered
in such cases may certainly be reversed; but this court is not prepared to
say that they are absolute nullities, 2"' 8 which may be totally disregarded."' 29

12328 U.S. (3
2
1 6 Id. at 193.

Pet.) 193 (1830).
See also Act of Feb. 6, 1889, 25 Stat. 655 (stating that the Supreme

Court received appellate jurisdiction over capital cases). The Supreme Court now has
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases. 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).
12728 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 203.
' See 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 207. Noting that the Court appears to be equating the word
"nullity" with lack ofjurisdiction; the Court states:
The cases are numerous, which decide that the judgments of a court of
record having general jurisdiction of the subject, although erroneous, are
binding until reversed. It is universally understood that the judgments of the
courts of the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown in the
pleadings, are yet binding an all the world; and that this apparent want of
jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error.
Id. See also Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 588-96. The Court's reference to Burford,and its
reversal because of the irregularity of the proceedings implies a wider scope for the word
jurisdiction than the word connotes in its narrowest sense meaning only that a court with power
to act properly had the parties before it. Id. The term "jurisdiction" had even a broader meaning
for the Marshall Court in other contexts, and Woolhandler has argued that Professor Bator's
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Marshall continued: "we are unanimously of opinion that the judgment of
a court of general criminal jurisdiction justifies his imprisonment, and that
the writ of habeas corpus ought not to be awarded. 3 '
Those who argue that habeas corpus was limited strictly to review
of the jurisdiction of the convicting court point confidently to Ex Parte
Watkins 3 ' as exhibit number one. Those who take the contrary view, that
habeas corpus existed from the seventeenth century on (or at least from
the early nineteenth century from Burford and Bollman on) as a
mechanism to effect release wherever there was a violation of fundamental
law point to the Supreme Court's lack of appellate jurisdiction as the
important factor in the courts declining habeas review. It is a debate that
cannot yield a clear-cut answer. Some historical questions cannot be
definitively resolved.
C. Habeas CorpusBefore the Civil War
Before the Civil War,' Congress provided two minor statutory
extensions of habeas corpus. The first, passed in 1833, allowed the
federal courts to release on a writ of habeas corpus federal officers
imprisoned for carrying out their federal duties. The issue arose out of
South Carolina's near revolt over tariffs, and the imprisonment, by state
officials, of federal officers charged with carrying out the law.133 Political
resolution ended the matter, and the extension of the Great Writ spawned
by that controversy has nearly been forgotten.
The second act, passed in 1842,131 involved a squabble between

analysis which points to the jurisdictional limits adhered to by the Marshall Court in habeas
corpus fails to take this ambiguity inherent in the Court's use of the word into account. Id.
12928 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 205.
"0 Id.at 209.
13128 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
1 For many years Southerners referred to the Civil War as the "War of Northern
Aggression."
supra note 1, at 187-88.
"34
Herbert Wechsler, HabeasCorpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsideringthe
Reach of the Great Writ, 59 U.CoL. L. REv. 167, 168 (1988).
133DUKER,
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the United States, Canada, and Great Britain revolving around a British
citizen, Alexander McLeod, who, apparently, had been one of the British
soldiers who, acting on the orders of a superior, had destroyed an
American vessel. New York state arrested him and charged him with
arson and murder for his part in the affair. Britain indignantly protested
the arrest.'35 The diplomatic brouhaha outlasted McLeod's trial (he was
acquitted).' 36 The Tyler administration, anxious to avoid a diplomatic
confrontation, proposed a legislative remedy.' 37 Congress passed the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, which empowered federal courts to issue
writs of habeas corpus:
in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or
confinement, where he, she, or they, being subjects or
citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, shall be
committed or confined, or in custody, under or by any
authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the
United States, or of any one of them, for or on account of
any act done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or
claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of
any foreign State or Sovereignty, the validity and effect
whereof38depend upon the law of nations, or under color
thereof. 1
Thus, the 1833 and 1842 legislations are important today because
they provided two instances of legislation empowering the federal courts

3 David J. Bedennan, The CautionaryTale ofAlexander McLeod: SuperiorOrders
and the American Writ ofHabeasCorpus, 41 EMORY L.J. 515, 516 (1992).
36
' Id. at 526.
117Id. at 527.
3s Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §2241
(c)(4) (1993)).
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to intervene in the state criminal process. 39 While they may have
constituted minor additions to the scope of federal habeas review, in them,
Congress did give the federal courts the power to intervene in state
criminal matters. Nor were these simply matters of federal intervention in
cases where the state courts lacked jurisdiction in the sense that the courts
traditionally had used that term. Federal courts were authorized in the
narrow circumstances of each statute to intervene directly in the state
criminal process. This becomes important in interpreting the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 which is discussed below, and which greatly
broadened the scope of habeas corpus review in the state criminal process.
D. The Civil War

The acrimonious, and often bloody, debate over slavery, erupted
into civil war. Recall that the constitutional provision allowed suspension
of the writ "in cases of Rebellion.""'' Abraham Lincoln had a rebellion; he
also was one of the most astute lawyers of his era, and knew how to avail
himself of an ambiguity. The Habeas Corpus clause failed to specify
which branch of government would have the power to suspend the writ.
Lincoln also knew how to take power, and he did so by authorizing his
generals to suspend the writ. 4 ' They did so, and that brought the case of
John Merryman.42 before the pro-Southern Justice Taney,143 Chief Justice

of the United States Supreme Court.
3

Ironically, the Act has been utilized only four times - all unsuccessfully. Bederman,

supra note 131, at 531. The Act remains in force (codified in 28 U.S.C. 2241 (c)(4)), even
though its activating principle (the defense of acting on a superior's orders) has been eroded in
international law by the fourth NTlrenberg Principle. Id. at 534.
140
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9.
141DUKER,

supra note 1, at 146.
1' Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Cas. 144 (1861).
143Chief Justice Taney, a Marylander, sympathized with the South. He was appointed
by Andrew Jackson to the Supreme Court in 1836 to succeed John Marshall. His Southern
leanings are demonstrated by his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 389
(1857), where, writing for the majority, he invalidated part of the Missouri Compromise, thus
returning Dred Scott to slavery, even though he had been transported to free Illinois by his
master. The case is one of the more infamous in the annals of U.S. jurisprudence.
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General Cadwalader ordered Merryman arrested and then
imprisoned at Fort McHenry. Merryman sought a writ of habeas corpus,
addressed to Roger B. Taney, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for
Maryland. Taney issued the writ directing that Merryman be brought
before him so that the legality of his incarceration could be determined.
General Cadwalader refused to obey, asserting that "he is duly authorized
by the [P]resident to suspend"1" the writ. Taney wrote a stinging opinion,
ruling that only the Congress could suspend the writ.'45 But he had only
the support of the marshall's office to enforce it; Lincoln and Cadwalader
had the army. Taney wrote: "In such a case, my duty was too plain to be
mistaken. I have exercised all the power which the constitution and laws
confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for
me to overcome."" Lincoln continued to suspend habeas corpus, without
congressional authorization, until 1863 when Congress acquiesced by
sanctioning executive suspension of habeas corpus.147
E. The Habeas CorpusAct of186748
Robert E. Lee's surrender of the once proud Army of Virginia at
Appomattox in April 1865, followed by Joseph E. Johnston's capitulation
a few weeks later with the remnants of his destroyed command, ended the
bloodiest conflict in American history. The United States Congress, minus
effective Southern opposition, quickly moved to amend the Constitution,

'" Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Cas. at 147.
141
Id.at 148.
141Id. at 153.
47

1 DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA

47 (1966). Meador

points out that "[a] striking parallel to the Merryman episode occurred in Hawaii following the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Martial law was declared and habeas corpus
suspended. Over a year after the attack some civilians in military custody filed petitions for the
writ in the United States District Court, but, as in Merryman, service of process could not at first
be effectuated on the military commander. Eventually, though, habeas corpus cases did work
their way to the Supreme Court, and military rule was held illegal." Id. (citations omitted).
148 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 153, 14 stat. 385 (1867) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1993)).
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and enact reconstruction legislation. The Thirteenth Amendment'49
abolished slavery; the Fourteenth 5° provided for due process and equal
protection under the laws, among other things; and the Fifteenth
guaranteed black male enfranchisement. 1 ' "The Reconstruction Act of
1867 required universal male suffrage in the rebel states."' 52 Northern
political powers distrusted Southern governments and institutions. At the
same time, Southerners could, without visible trace of irony or hyperbole,
hurl the single word epithet "damn-yankee." The era's political imbroglio
did not revolve simply around the North-South conflict. The Supreme
Court was widely perceived to be hostile to radical reconstruction, and
opposed to many aspects of the attendant military rule. With Lincoln dead
by the hand of John Wilkes Booth,'53 and his successor, Andrew Johnson,
politically crippled, only the Court remained a significant obstacle. Habeas
corpus must be understood in the broader context of Congress's political
struggle with the Supreme Court and the fight over the radical
reconstruction of the South after the Civil War. The radical Republicans
who controlled Congress were committed to a legislative program of harsh
reconstruction for the South. The Supreme Court was unsympathetic. It
was suspected that the Supreme Court might, if it had the chance,
undermine the reconstruction program.
The Supreme Court's aversion to reconstruction became evident

'4'Proclaimed

ratified December 18, 1865.
0Proclaimed ratified July 28, 1968.

"'

Adopted in 1870.
' Alan Clarke and Steven B. Pershing, Back to the Future:Local Redistrictingfor

Minority Votes in Virginia,3 J. VA. TRIAL LAW. Ass'N 19 (1991).

...
My great-great grandmother, Betty Rollins, who was an inveterate gossip, played
an inadvertent role in the capture of John Wilkes Booth. She apparently told the U.S. officers
in pursuit that one of Booth's confederates was courting a certain young lady and therefore,
could be found in the hotel at Bowling Green, Virginia. The young man, confronted in the
middle of the night by the unshaven and unwashed federal troopers, (who, more importantly,
awakened him and then placed a Colt .44 to his head) not surprisingly, gave up Booth's location
on a nearby farm. Apparently, Betty knew who was courting whom, and didn't mind telling. A
vicious rumor later circulated that the Rollin's later wealth (long since dissipated in the
Depression) came from Yankee pay-offs. I am not able to give a source for this family legend,
nor am I able to vouch for its authenticity.
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in the 1866 case of Ex ParteMilligan.5 4 Milligan, a civilian, was hauled
before a military commission and received a death sentence by hanging.
Milligan sought habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court, lost, and
appealed to the Supreme Court. The majority opinion pointed out the
incongruity of applying martial law in a state that had not seceded, and
where the court system remained intact and in operation; concluding, that
the military commission lacked jurisdiction. The Milligan case presented
a simple question of habeas corpus reaching a conviction emanating from
a federal tribunal that lacked jurisdiction; it thus fell within the Judiciary
Act of 1789. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 emerged in this misgiving
and acrimonious context. It granted federal courts the "power to grant
writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of
his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States."' 55 The words could hardly seem more plain, yet the
meaning and intent of the text has spawned an intense debate.' 56 The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 became effective February 5, 1867. By
Court had its first case under the new law, Ex
December the Supreme
57
1
ParteMcCardle.
William McCardle was a Mississippian, a newspaperman, and "a
thom in the side of Major-General E.O.C. Ord, the Commanding General
of the Fourth Military District, comprising the states of Arkansas and
:
Ord's charge was to carry out radical reconstruction.
Mississippi.0"'
McCardle, through his paper the Vicksburg Times,'59 attacked vigorously:
There is not a man who will pay any tax imposed by this
convention.., their tax collectors... will be shot down
like dogs, as they are! They will deserve to be shot, and
we advise every man to resist the payment of such a tax
11471

U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).

155 14

Stat. 385 (1867).

15 See, e.g., Lewis Mayers, The Habeas CorpusAct of 1867: The Supreme Court as

Legal Historian,33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965); Oaks, supranote 3, at 451.
157 73 U.S. 318 (1867).
'58MARKE, supra note 91, at 142.
9
..
Id. at 142.
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. . .The people of Mississippi are in no humor to be
trifled with... and they are determined not to be robbed!
The men who attempt it will certainly get hurt, for they
will be treated as all robbers and highwaymen deserve to
be treated.
The insolence and villany of this convention is boundless.
The adventurers from abroad, the renegades of home
production, and the Negroes assembled with them seem
to think that they are the masters of the people, and that
they can rob them at pleasure. 6 °
McCardle's crime, under the Reconstruction Act of 1867 included: "(1)
disturbance of the public peace; (2) inciting to insurrection, disorder, and
violence, (3) libel; and (4) impeding reconstruction."16" '
The Supreme Court concluded that the Court had jurisdiction
under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and that they would proceed, at a
later date, to hear the matter on the merits. In arriving at that conclusion
the court said of the Act:
The first section gives to the several courts, of the United
States, and the several justices and judges of such courts
within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the
authority already conferred by law, power to grant writs
of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of
any treaty or law of the United States.
This legislation is of the most comprehensive character.
It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every
court and of every judge every possible case of privation
16

Id.at 143 (quoting from the Vicksburg Times).

16173 U.S. at 320.
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of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties,
62
or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction.1
Here the Supreme Court is asserting that Congress had intended
to grant to the federal courts the broadest possible powers to intervene in
the state criminal process. The Supreme Court and Congress would have
been aware of the earlier legislation in 1833 and 1842 giving the federal
courts the power to intervene in the state criminal process in ways that
went far beyond the narrow jurisdictional constraints placed upon habeas
corpus by the Marshall Court. 6 1 Congress had the power to broaden the
scope of habeas corpus to allow federal courts to upset final judgements
from the state criminal justice system. Those who argue that the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 imported the narrow jurisdictional constraints of
habeas corpus as it existed historically tend to ignore this language.
Indeed, the primary proponent of the theory, Professor Bator, begins his
analysis in 1886, with Ex Parte Royall 64 (the first post-Civil War case
before the
Supreme Court that presented habeas review of a state criminal
165
matter).

The Supreme Court, in McCardle I, agreed to hear the case on the
merits but before the Court could act Congress stepped in and enacted
legislation designed to strip the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under the
new act."6 The Court accepted Congress's mandate, and found that,
notwithstanding the fact that the case had already been argued, and was
merely awaiting the Court's decision, the case had to be dismissed for want

Id. at 325-26 (emphasis added).
Peller, supra note 1, at 616 (stating that: "Bator's contention that relitigation of
substantive issues was foreign to habeas corpus law prior to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 is
also contradicted by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1833, which specifically permitted federal habeas
courts to entertain claims by state prisoners who were held for committing acts authorized by
federal law.").
117 U.S. 241 (1886).
16SBator, supra note 3, at 478.
'"Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44.
'n
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The Supreme Court was not to regain jurisdiction under

the 1867 Act until 1885,168 long after reconstruction had faded.'69

Modem legal scholars have questioned the Court's capitulation in
view of the power ceded to the Congress. 70 However, Justice Marshall
in Ex Parte Bollman," had established Congress' power to withhold
habeas corpus review from the federal courts over prisoners in state
custody.'72 Moreover, the habeas corpus legislation of 1833 and 1842
appears to have been in accordance with the idea that Congress had the
power to grant or withhold habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners in the
federal courts. Congress' action accorded with this precedent. Given the
bitter relations between the Congress and the Court, and the weight of the
Marshall Court precedent, it is not surprising that the Court acquiesced.
Still the Court might have ruled that the legislation came too late as
McCardle's case had already been heard on the merits.'
Even had the Court accorded full validity to the repeal of the
Court's jurisdiction under the 1867 Act, it retained jurisdiction over federal
prisoners (and the U.S. military had held McCardle) under section
fourteen of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Supreme Court had exercised

167 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S.(7 Wall.) 506 (1868); this case is sometimes referred
to as McCardle n1in order to distinguish it from the first decision accepting jurisdiction.
168Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
169 See Peller, supra note 1, at 678 (arguing that Batorian analysis ignores lower
federal court habeas cases during the period in which the Supreme Court lacked appellate
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867). These cases tended to
construe the act broadly, "and permitted every available constitutional claim to be heard on
habeas, regardless of prior state court jurisdiction." Id. at 623. The fact that the lower federal
courts took McCardle at its word and construed habeas corpus broadly during this period
supports the theory that state habeas corpus existed from 1867 on to redress state prisoner claims
of imprisonment in violation of due process (fundamental law). Id.
170 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Ex ParteMcCardle, 15
ARIZ. L. REv. 229, 244 n. 58 (1973); David Allen Perry, ExParteMcCardle:The Power to
Limit the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court as Understoodby the Congress, the
President,and the Court, 18 CAP. U.L. REv. 365, 367 (1989).
"' 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
172Paschal, supra note 104, at 605.
'7 Van Alstyne, supranote 170, at 244.
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jurisdiction over this type of case since Ex Parte Hamilton174 in 1795.
That the Court could have decided McCardle irrespective of any loss of
jurisdiction under the 1867 Act is proven by its handling of a similar case,
Ex Parte Yerger,175 one year later. Yerger also involved charges brought
against a Southerner by a military commission under the reconstruction
act. Thus, Ex Parte Yerger's procedural posture duplicated that of
McCardle I, with the sole difference being that the case explicitly raised
the issue of the Court's jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789 rather
than its now ended jurisdiction under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
The Court concluded:
[t]he general spirit and genius of our institutions has
tended to the widening and enlarging of the habeas
corpusjurisdiction of the courts and judges of the United
States; and this tendency, except in one recent instance,
has been constant and uniform; and it is in the light of it
that we must determine the true meaning of the
Constitution and the law in respect to the appellate
jurisdiction of this court

. . .

the case is one of those

expressly declared not to be excepted from the general
grant ofjurisdiction.'76
The Court found that it possessed jurisdiction, but the collision with the
Reconstruction Act never occurred. Yerger's lawyer and the Attorney
General agreed to turn Yerger "over to the civil authorities and his petition
was withdrawn. The question therefore becoming moot, Congress took
no further action ...and the last opportunity to test the Constitutionality

of the ReconstructionLaws finally came to naught.'"177
Yerger supports those who argue that habeas continued to evolve
acquiring ever broader scope with respect to unlawful confinement. It

1743 U.S. (3 Dal.) 17 (1795).

'"75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
76
1 1Id. at 102.
177
MARKFE,supra note 91, at 164.

HABEAS CORPUS

19981

409

also supports those who argue that habeas corpus was ever more actively
used as a part of criminal confinements as opposed to executive branch
confinement such as those imposed by the Stuart Kings. Yerger is,
however, far from conclusive proof that the scope of the writ had greatly
expanded. The case came to the Court pretrial and not postconviction,
and the issue revolved around the jurisdiction of the military commission
to tryYerger. Those who would so cabin Yerger have difficulty with the
two habeas corpus matters - Ex ParteLange,'7 8 and
Supreme Court's next
79
Ex Parte Siebold.1
180
Edward Lange was convicted of the theft of postal equipment
by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New
York. The Court sentenced Lange to a fine and imprisonment under a
statute that provided for a fine or imprisonment. The issue before the
Supreme Court involved a simple constitutional double jeopardy question,
i.e., being sentenced twice for the same offense. Jurisdiction over the
person or the offense was unquestioned and unquestionable. If habeas
corpus was confined to testing the power of the trial court to try the case,
then Lange should have lost. However, he won. The Court expanded, or
perhaps conflated, jurisdictional concepts to include a verdict that violated
the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court paid
due obeisance to the jurisdictional fiction that usually constrained habeas
corpus by reasoning that a sentence that violated the Constitution was void
and outside the power of the sentencing court. There was no disguising
the fact that this case upset a final conviction imposed by a court that had
jurisdiction under traditional conceptions of the doctrine.
Ex Parte Siebold in 1879, again expanded the scope of habeas
corpus to reach beyond narrow jurisdictional defects.' 8' This time the
Court decided that a sentence was void if imposed under an
unconstitutional statute. Siebold had been convicted in federal court in
Baltimore of "'stuffing the ballot-box." 8 2 Siebold challenged the

178 85
179

U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
100 U.S. 371 (1879).

85 U.S. at 164.
...
' 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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constitutionality of the statute under which he stood convicted. The Court
decided against him on the merits, but in reaching the merits it decided
that it possessed jurisdiction to hear the issue of the statute's
constitutionality on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court said:
"An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense created by
it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is
illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment."' 83
Both Lange and Siebold cited Ex Parte Watkins." 4 But the
concept of jurisdictional defects sufficient to void a criminal case had now
expanded beyond anything ever contemplated by Chief Justice Marshall.
The argument that these cases were aberrational, and that the scope of
habeas corpus remained narrow, draws sustenance from the Supreme
Court's next foray into habeas corpus in 1886 - Ex Parte Royall.85
'
By the time the Supreme Court decided Ex ParteRoyall, Congress
had returned jurisdiction under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.186
William L. Royall was charged with violation of a Virginia statute
regarding the sale of the state's public bonds; the prosecution proceeded
in the trial court in Richmond. 8 7 Royall had been bailed, "but was
subsequently surrendered by his sureties"'88 though it was not clear from
the record that he could not "give security for his appearance in the state
court, or that reasonable bail is denied him, or that his trial will be
unnecessarily delayed."' 89 It appears that Royall may have surrendered his
bail simply to put his case in a procedural posture to present his
constitutional 9 ' attack on the Virginia statute in federal habeas corpus

182Id. at 379.
183Id. at 3 76-77.
"4 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)193 (1830). See also Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 166, Siebold,
100 U.S. at 375.
"'
117 U.S. 241 (1886).
186Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
181 117 U.S. at 244.
I8sId. at 250.
189Id.
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before the ordinary criminal process in Virginia had run. Thus, the
Supreme Court confronted a murky case - the need for intervention was
unclear. The Commonwealth ofVirginia appeared to be working through
its criminal process in the normal fashion, and if Royall were acquitted, the
underlying case on the merits would become moot. Furthermore, it was
not clear from the pretrial posture of this case that this amounted to
anything more than a bail issue. If Royall could be bailed, then the
immediate incarceration would become moot. Thus, the Supreme Court
had every reason to find a way to avoid the issues presented. That is what
the Court did. It affirmed the federal circuit. court's dismissal of Royall's
petition, on the ground that the lower court had the discretion to require
him to exhaust his state remedies. Essentially, it had to go through the
state system before seeking relief in the federal court system. In so doing
the Court fashioned the precursor of the present rule of exhaustion which
is codified in 28 U.S.C. 2254 (b).
Those who construe the writ's scope narrowly point to Royall as
an example of a case that appeared to defer-to the state's adjudicatory
processes. This, it is asserted, supports the view that federal habeas
corpus (even as it moved beyond the narrowest conceptions of a writ that
provided relief only from jurisdictional error) still existed only to correct
institutional failures where the state failed to provide an appropriate forum
for determining the facts of the case. Under this view, a federal habeas
court would be precluded from reviewing a case where the state provided
an appropriate forum for determining the merits of a criminal case.
However, Justice Harlan's parting language in the unanimous opinion
undercuts that claim:
As it does not appear that the Circuit Court might not, in
its discretion and consistently with law and justice, have
denied the applications for the writ at the time they were
'90See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 245 (stating that the question presented "is
whether the Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction on habeas corpus to discharge
from custody one who is restrained of his liberty in violation of the National Constitution, but
who, at the time, is held under State process for trial on an indictment charging him with an
offense against the laws of the State.").
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made, we are of opinion that the judgment in each case
must be affirmed, but without prejudice to the right of the
petitioner to renew his applicationsto that court at some
future time should the circumstances render itproper to
91
do so. 1
Since the case came to the Court on appeal from the Federal Circuit Court,
it is clear from this statement that Royall would be able to renew his
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court once the
proceedings in the state courts were final. Royall simply creates a rule of
exhaustion that allowed federal courts to defer to the state court processes
in the first instance, while retaining the power to address any constitutional
violations once the state procedures are complete. - ,'
Those who seek to use history to narrowly constrain the Great
Writ have either to overlook Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'92 or treat it as a
momentary lapse,' 93 an odd error by an inattentive Supreme Court. Yick
Wo involved two separate cases of Chinese laundrymen fined and
imprisoned for violating racist anti-Chinese local legislation. The Board
of Supervisors of San Francisco prohibited laundry operations conducted
in wooden buildings without a discretionary permit. The Board, in issuing
permits, exercised its unfettered discretion generally. in favor of Caucasian
proprietors, and consistently against Oriental proprietors, who seemed
never to be able to meet the requirements. One Chinese laundryman's
conviction reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal; the other, Yick
Wo, reached the Supreme Court on appeal from an adverse decision on
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the California Supreme Court.
If there were ever a case where the Supreme Court might have
distinguished the scope of direct appeal from habeas corpus, Yick Wo
provided the opportunity. The Court made no such distinction. It found
due process and equal protection violations under the Fourteenth

191Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
192118 U.S. 356 (1886).
, Bator, supra note 3, at 480.

HABEAS CORPUS

19981

413

Amendment in both cases, and granted relief in both cases without
distinguishing the procedural posture of the two cases. The Court held:
And while this consent of the supervisors is
withheld from them and from two hundred others who
have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese
subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are
permitted to carry on the same business under similar
conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted.
No reason f6r it ... exists except hostility to the race and

nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in
the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is,
therefore, illegal, and the public administration which
enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws
and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is,
therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged. 94
For the first time an imprisonment was reversed on due process
and equal protection grounds on a writ of habeas corpus. If Yick Wo
existed in isolation in 1886 it might plausibly be dismissed as aberrational.
Yick Wo came soon after Ex ParteLange, 195 and Ex ParteSiebold,'96 and
immediately before habeas relief was granted In Re Snow, 19 7 and only
198
three years before the sweeping pronouncements of Hans Nielsen.
Thus, Yick Wo is more properly viewed as the case that broadened the
reach of habeas corpus to redress fundamental injustices; essentially, these
were due process violations resulting in incarceration.' 99 Lange addressed

'94

118 U.S. at 374.

"85
196

U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
U.S. 371 (1879).

100

' 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
19g 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
199

Due process was, however, much less developed in that era, and the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate any of the substantive rights of the Bill
of Rights. Therefore, the conception of fundamental injustice as found in the constitutional
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double jeopardy violations; Siebold extended redress to convictions
stemming from an unconstitutional (hence void) statute; Yick Wo brought
habeas into the due process equal protection fold; and then In Re Snow
and Hans Nielsen continued the trend. Those who argue that the scope
of habeas corpus remained narrow during the latter part of the nineteenth
century must view each of these cases narrowly, and in isolation, ignoring
the over-arching pattern that tie these cases together. Lorenzo Snow, of
Utah, cohabited with seven wives.2"' Unfortunately for Snow, Congress
had made the practice unlawful. The Prosecutor procured three separate
indictments by dividing the time frame of the illegal cohabitation into three
discrete periods. Thus, Snow found himself with three separate
convictions, and more pertinently, with three consecutive six month
sentences and three separate three hundred dollar fines - the maximum for
each offense. A writ of habeas corpus failed before the District Court of
the First Judicial District of the Territory of Utah,2"' and proceeded to the
Supreme Court in 1886.
The government contended that:
[A]s the court which tried the indictments had jurisdiction
over the offenses charged in them, it had jurisdiction to
determine the questions raised by the demurrers to the
oral pleas in bar in the cases secondly and thirdly tried;
that it tried those questions; that those questions are the
same which are raised in the present proceeding; that they
cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus by any court; and
that they could only be reexamined here on a writ of error,
if one were authorized.2 2
Thus, the issue of whether the scope of habeas corpus remained limited to
a narrow jurisdictional compass was squarely joined. The Court, citing Ex

values of that era was quite different from our late twentieth century conceptions.
200 120 U.S. 274,276 (1887).
20 120 U.S. at 280.
202
Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
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ParteMilligan,2" 3 Ex ParteLange,2" 4 and Ex Parte Wilson,. 5 dismissed

the contention. It asserted that where "the want of jurisdiction appears on
20 6
the face of the judgment, the objection may be taken on habeas corpus."
Where was the jurisdictional flaw in Snow? The error, involved
a constitutional violation - double jeopardy. The intentional conflation of
constitutional error with want of jurisdiction best explains the terse
language used by the Court. The Court could not have been unaware,
through so many cases, of traditional conceptions of jurisdiction. The
fundamental change being wrought by these post-Civil War (and postHabeas Corpus Act of 1867) cases revolved around the incorporation of
constitutional values, as then understood, into the ambit of habeas relief.
Though the Court continued to use traditional words to describe what it
was doing, the process was radically changing. Much like the fourteenth
century change wrought by the marriage of habeas corpus with other writs
such as certiorari, habeas corpus now found itself attached to other newer
concepts, which in turn changed the nature of habeas corpus. As a result,
some of the Court's phraseology may be confusing unless these cases are
viewed together, and as establishing a new pattern, albeit cast in older
linguistic formulae.
In 1889, Hans Nielsen was charged with and convicted of
2
bigamy. "7 The prosecutor next charged Hans with adultery on the theory
that the only true marriage was with his first wife, thus making his liaison
with the second wife adulterous. Han's "entered orally a ...formal plea
of former conviction 2°8 to no avail, and received an additional 125 days

in the penitentiary.2 °9 Han's habeas petition wrangled on to the Supreme
Court. The constitutional doctrine of double jeopardy provided the
substantive basis for relief.21° In determining the applicability of habeas
203 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)2 (1866).

2485 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
203114 U.S. 417 (1885).
206120 U.S. at 285.
207Hans Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
' 08 d. at 177.
20
1 Id. at 178.
21
11d. at 183.
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corpus the Court used some of its broadest language yet:
It is firmly established that if the court which renders a
judgment has not jurisdiction to render it, either because
the proceedings, or the law under which they are taken,
are unconstitutional, or for any other reason, the judgment
is void and may be questioned collaterally, and a
defendant who is imprisoned under and by virtue of it
may be discharged from custody on habeas corpus. 1
Habeas now clearly addresses unconstitutional proceedings or laws as well
as jurisdictional defects. The Court recognized that although prior cases
had expanded the scope of habeas corpus to reach unconstitutional
statutes, this case squarely presented the unconstitutional application of
law to an individual. The Court, for the first time met the issue head on:
In the present case, it is true, the ground for the habeas
corpus was, not the invalidity of an act of Congress under
which the defendant was indicted, but a second
prosecution and trial for the same offence, contrary to an
express provision of the Constitution. In other words, a
constitutional immunity of the defendant was violated by
the second trial and judgment. It is difficult to see why a
conviction andpunishment under an unconstitutionallaw
is more violative of a person's constitutionalrights, than
an unconstitutionalconviction andpunishment under a
valid law.212

Those, like Professor Bator, who argue for a narrowly circumscribed
habeas review, see this language in Hans Nielsen as mere obiter dicta,2" 3
essentially disconnected from the broader pattern herein advanced. Dicta
' Id. at 182.
Nielson, 131 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added).
23 Bator, supra note 3, at 472.
2.2Hans
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is perhaps in the eye of the beholder. Bator is straining hard to maintain
his thesis at this point and he needs to characterize it as a mere "passing
'
expression[]."214
It is difficult to see why this language is dicta and not
ratio decidendi. The case involved the abridgment of an individual's
constitutional rights, and this language focuses directly thereon. Habeas
corpus has through In Re Lange, In Re Siebold, Yick Wo, In Re Snow, and

Hans Nielsen, taken as a group, reached fundamental constitutional
violations at the individual level.
Cases existed during the period that denied habeas relief, because
these cases chanted the jurisdictional mantra in denying relief they are
latched onto as evidence that habeas corpus remained, if not narrowly
cabined, at least schizophrenic. The cases are, with one possible
exception, little cases, of marginal significance, and not involving
fundamental laws or injustices under the standards of the era. These cases
are perfectly consistent with the view that habeas corpus, while not serving
as a writ of error, could reach fundamental constitutional error under the
due process clause of the constitution.
In Re Coy215 involved an attack on the election fraud laws; the
legislation was found to be valid, and the habeas corpus petition was
rejected. Not only was no fundamental injustice involved; it appears that
justice (not to mention, the integrity of the election laws) was well served
by the decision.
Another case denying habeas relief, In Re Wood,216 seems more
problematic to our late twentieth century sensibilities, informed as they are
by a due process clause that has subsumed most of the Bill of Rights. In
Re Wood involved an African American charged with and convicted of
murder and sentenced to death without the assistance of counsel.217 Wood
214id.
215127 U.S. 731 (1888).
216 140

U.S. 278 (1891).
1d. at 279. See also Powell V.Alabama, 278 U.S. 45 (1932) (noting that the right
to counsel in capital cases was established and even then the rule did not purport to be per se,
and was considered to be a matter of due process rather than a specific right under the sixth
amendment). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (stating that the right to
counsel in all serious cases involving substantial incarceration was established as a sixth
217
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later alleged on habeas corpus that African Americans were systematically
excluded from the Grand and Petit juries. The Supreme Court had

previously held in Neal v. Delaware,"' on direct review, that the exclusion
of blacks from juries violated equal protection." 9 This disparate treatment
of a constitutional equal protection claim on direct review has led some to
view Wood as demonstrating a limitation on the scope of habeas review.2 0
However, the case is better read as demonstrating an embryonic form of
procedural default.221 Wood was without counsel and had failed to raise
the issue at trial.222 Moreover, the jury discrimination was not compelled
by state law; rather the discrimination emanated from local practice, which
made the matter peculiarly fact-bound from the Supreme court's position.
amendment right applicable to the states).
2.. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
219
Id. at 392-94.
220 Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 600-01. Arguing:
Peller fails to account for the fact that on direct review of state court
convictions, the Court addressed certain constitutional issues - such as jury
discrimination - that it flatly refused to consider on habeas. For example, in
Neal v. Delawarethe Court on direct review addressed the merits of an
equal protection claim that state officials had excluded blacks from juries.
By contrast, in In Re Wood, the Court refused to consider on habeas the
merits of a similar claim of jury discrimination. Justice Harlan in Wood
distinguished Neal precisely because it had come to the Court by way of
writ of error rather than on habeas. Clearly, some issues reviewable upon
direct review of a state court conviction were not reviewable in a habeas
proceeding.
Id.
21 See Id. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 n.35 (1963); In Re Shibuya
Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291 (1891) (noting that the issue posited in Wood was also presented in this
case during the same term of court and found directly after Wood). It may be that one of the
reasons for refusing to entertain this issue on the merits was a fear of losing the floodgates to
cases that had not been addressed in the state courts and had not received any factual
development before federal habeas review. Moreover, as Professor Peller points out, "[t]he
habeas court did not have power to modify the judgment of the state court because at that time,
the only relief which it could render was unconditional release." Peller, supra note 1, at 639
(citations omitted). This makes it all the more unlikely that the Court would have wanted to grant
relief.
222 140 U.S. at 279.
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The facts had not been developed before the New York courts. Indeed,
the issue does not even appear to have been raised in the Court of Appeals
of the State of New York 2.3 even though Wood by then had counsel - the
same lawyer who would later represent him in the federal habeas corpus
proceedings. The Court observed:
Without expressing any opinion upon this point, we are
satisfied that the question now made as to the exclusion of
citizens of the African race from the lists of grand and
petit jurors, because of their race, could have been raised
and determined by the trial court, upon its merits, under
a motion to set aside the indictment. 224
The modem mind balks at saddling a prisoner sentenced to death with the
consequences of his own ignorance - but no right to counsel existed in that
era. In Gideon v. Wainwright,225 the creation of a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel that was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause did not occur until 1963.6 Wood's

failure to properly raise the issue and make a factual record and to give the
state courts an opportunity to first address his claim becomes inextricably
interwoven in the modem mind with the right to counsel issue - an issue
that the Court in 1891 would not have considered relevant. What the
Court did do was discuss the failure to appropriately raise the claim as an
exhaustion issue under Ex ParteRoyall.2" Clearly, if a defendant fails to
raise an issue in the state courts then those courts will not have had an
opportunity to address the issue. This failure to raise the issue in the trial
court thus could be viewed as a failure to exhaust the claim under Royall.
The fact that the Court had not yet developed the modem way of phrasing
the issue does not detract from the fact that the Court in Wood was not so

223State v. Joseph Wood, 123 N.Y. 632 (1890).
224 140

U.S. at 288.

223372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22

6 Id.
227117

U.S. 241 (1886).
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much noting a limitation on the scope of habeas corpus as it was placing
limits on how any issue might be raised procedurally, whether by direct
appeal or habeas corpus.
Thus, Wood supports the proposition that habeas corpus, from
1867 on, addressed fundamental constitutional claims (that is due process
violations under the standards of the era) when those claims were properly
raised and put before the Court.
In Re Tyler22 constitutes the obverse of the ancient battle of the
English central courts using habeas corpus to protect and extend their
jurisdiction at the expense of the local or manorial courts. The case
presented the Supreme Court with an original petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The sheriff, acting under state law, had levied on the assets of a
railway company in order to collect local taxes. The assets were, however,
in the hands of a. receiver who was acting under orders from the federal
circuit court. The sheriff had previously been enjoined by the federal court
from making the levy, and he had apparently been given ample
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt that flowed from violation
of the injunction. He remained obstinate. It seems hardly surprising that
the United States Supreme Court would, on these facts, refuse to grant a
writ of habeas corpus.. The case lacked a viable constitutional claim.
Moreover, the lower federal courts ability to act in a matter of national
interest was protected by the Court's refusal to grant the writ.
Whitten v. Tomlinson229 involved mere technical error (if error it

was) by a state court. George E. Whitten, who stood charged of second
degree murder, complained about various deficiencies in the indictment;
he proffered a confused double jeopardy argument; and he contested the
factual underpinnings of his extradition. The Court found a failure to
exhaust under the rule of Ex ParteRoyallP because the trial on the merits
had yet to occur. The Court further emphasized that "even after such final
determination in [state] courts, [the federal courts] will generally leavethe
petitioner to the usual and orderly course of proceeding by writ of error
149 U.S. 164 (1893).
160 U.S. 231 (1895).

228

2129

230117 U.S. 241 (1886).
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from this court."' 23 ' This language does not mean, as some have
mistakenly taken it, that the federal courts would eschew habeas relief
absent jurisdiction in the convicting court. As Professor Liebman argues:
Both the Whitten and Tyler Courts were true to their
word. Justice Gray did not hold - as he much more
easily and briefly could have - that, not being dispositive
of the detaining court's subject matter or personal
jurisdiction, the double jeopardy and right -to- indictment
claims were outside the Court's habeas corpus authority.
Rather, Justice Gray was at pains to show that Whitten did
not allege a constitutional violation, and at best alleged
only technical error. Likewise, Chief Justice Fuller's
repeated conclusions that the detaining court had
jurisdiction did not stop him from reviewing Tyler's
nonjurisdictional constitutional defenses based on
federalism and anti-tax-injunction principles. 2
Liebman concludes correctly: "[w]hat emerges from Whitten and Tyler is
not a distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims, but
rather a distinction between more or less fundamental types of claims, be
2 33
they jurisdictional or not."
Thus, by the close of the nineteenth century, habeas corpus
redressed fundamental constitutional error arising from convictions and
confinements within the state or federal court system. The Court's
repeated use of the "no jurisdiction" talisman had become a convenient
fiction. That the formalistic nineteenth century Court remained loath to
discard the "no jurisdiction" formula is not surprising. What does seem
surprising is the number of modem scholars who seem to have been
mislead by it. Whatever had been the original intent of the framers of the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, the Court's had now turned it into a remedy

231 160

U.S. at 242.
232Liebman, supra note 2, at 2053-54.
233Id. at 2054.
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for the small number of truly fundamental claims that met that era's
constitutional conceptions.
F The Twentieth Century
No habeas case stirs more passionate debate than Frank v.
Mangum.2" Much of the discussion revolves around Leo Frank's almost
certain innocence; the mob dominated proceedings swayed by virulent
racial, ethnic, and religious prejudices; and finally, the Governor's
courageous and politically disastrous commutation, followed by the
mindless and terrifying lynch mob that wreaked vengeance, leaving Leo
236
Frank's lifeless body - strange fruit235 "twisting in the Georgia dawn."
The issue that stimulates habeas lawyers is more prosaic, but no
less important. Did the case expand, contract, or have no effect on the
scope of habeas review? While some may see the case "as restrictive with
respect to the habeas jurisdiction, '231 the more interesting debate for our
purposes centers on the other two possibilities - that habeas review either
expanded slightly or remained essentially unchanged.
Those who view Yick Wo as aberrational, and Lange, Siebold,
Snow, and Nielsen, as minor exceptions to a habeas review, otherwise
firmly tethered to its no review absent jurisdictional error standard, see
Frankv. Mangum as a slight expansion in the scope of habeas review. For
this narrowly constrained version of habeas, Frank v. Mangum opens the
possibility of habeas review to correct gross institutional failures - as
where a state fails to provide its own corrective mechanisms.238
Those who see habeas by this time as providing broad relief count
Frankv. Mangum as only demonstrating Justice Pitney's crabbed view of
234237 U.S. 309 (1915).

" Impassioned blues artist Billy Holliday lamented Southern fondness for lynching
in the provocative
tune Strange Fruit.
6
Franklin D. Ormsten, The Lawyer's Bookshelf,N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 1988, at 2 (book
review of LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE).
237 Bator, supra note 3, at 486 n. 119 (citing, Curtis R. Reitz, The Abortive State
Proceeding,
74 HARV. L. REv. 1315, 1329 (1961)).
' 3 Id. at 483-84.
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due process. This perspective argues that Frank v. Mangum "seems
grounded not in any want of power, for the Court described the federal
courts' habeas powers in the broadest terms... but rather in a narrow
'
conception of due process in state criminal justice."2 39

Jewish, Yankee, and living in the South at the cusp of the Ku Klux
Klan's revival, Leo Frank appeared alien and perverse to turn of the
century Atlanta Bible belters "passing from a harsh rural poverty to the
unfamiliar miseries of a nascent industrialization.""24 Convicted and
sentenced to death for the murder of thirteen year old Mary Phagan, the
almost certainly innocent241 Leo Frank contended on habeas corpus that
his mob dominated trial violated due process.242
Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority, repeatedly agreed that the
federal courts had jurisdiction in habeas corpus to decide the case. He
conceded in broad terms:
....
that it is open to the courts of the United States upon
an application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond
forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, to
the extent of deciding whether the prisoner has been
deprived of his liberty without due process of law, andfor
this purpose to inquire into jurisdictionalfacts,whether
they appear upon the record or not.243

He further conceded "[t]here is no doubt of the jurisdiction to issue the

239

Fay, 372 U.S. at 420.
Ormsten, supra note 231, at 2.

240

241Liebman,
'4'

supra note 2, at 2076 n.477.

237 U.S. at 324-28.

" Id. at 331 (emphasis added). It is clear from the emphasized language that even
Frankv.Mangum, despite its pinched view of due process, envisioned habeas corpus as a writ
that allowed the federal habeas court to look beyond the narrow record made by the state
criminal justice system. The argument that federal habeas courts were precluded from
independent fact-finding until the 1953 decision of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) is not
well supported by the primary case that Professor Bator and his followers cite for that
proposition.
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writ of habeas corpus. The question is as to the propriety of issuing it in
the present case." 2"
Again Justice Pitney proceeded to agree that due process
violations were cognizable on habeas corpus:
We of course agree that if a trial is in fact dominated by
a mob, so that the jury is intimidated and the trial judge
yields ... there is, in that court, a departure from due
process of law . . . [aInd if the State, supplying no
corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of
death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus
produced by mob domination, the State deprives the
accused
of his life or liberty without due process of
5
law.

24

Justice Pitney's focus is on the scope of due process and not on the ambit
of habeas corpus. What the majority did in Frankv. Mangum was to defer
to state appellate fact finding that rejected Leo Frank's factual predicate for
his due process claim. The Georgia courts, in the present case, proceeded
upon the theory that Frank would have been entitled to this relief had his
charges been true, and they refused a new trial only because they found his
charges untrue save in a few minor particulars not amounting to more than
irregularities, and not prejudicial to the accused. There was here no denial
of due process of law. 46 The emphasis is on the factual basis for a due
process claim; the scope of habeas corpus is not mentioned.
The most plausible reading, then, of Frank v. Mangum is not that
the remedy of habeas corpus remained narrow, increasing only to the
extent that it allowed an attack where there has been an' institutional
breakdown - that is, a failure to provide any corrective mechanism. The
far less strained analysis is that Justice Pitney meant exactly what he said the facts for him failed to support a due process claim. Those who seek

244237

U.S. at 332 (emphasis added).
335 (emphasis added).
Id.at 338.

24SId. at
246
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support for a narrowly circumscribed writ latch onto Justice Pitney's
remarks concerning the state's appellate fact finding as a "corrective
Process." This language, however, is more properly read as demonstrating
the Justice's primitive notions of due process. The court explicitly states
that once one has received a fair hearing "before a court of competent
jurisdiction, according to established modes of procedure [one has ipso
facto received] 'due process' in the constitutional sense."247 Even where
jurisdiction is allegedly "lost in the course of the proceedings," '248 state fact
finding of a failure to prove the due process violation will, according to
Justice Pitney suffice - not because of any jurisdictional limitations on
habeas corpus - but because the Constitution itself required no more.
A possible source of the confusion stems from the fact that
contraction of substantive law inevitably exerts an indirect narrowing of
related procedural remedies. The procedural devices in such case have a
smaller substantive field within which to operate. Thus, a narrowly
construed notion of substantive due process effectively reduces the reach
of habeas corpus. It would be a mistake to confuse one concept with the
other. Justice Pitney's pinched view of due process had the effect of
denying Leo Frank of the habeas remedy. It thereby caused an injustice.2 49
The majority opinion, however, left habeas's reach theoretically
untouched - due process violations (whatever they might be) remained
vindicable in habeas under Justice Pitney's view. If the notions of due
process were to expand (as they in fact later did) there is nothing in his
opinion to prevent redress pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. We, as a
society, are unlikely to return to Justice Pitney's conception of fairness as
embedded in the due process clause. The attempt to strip habeas corpus
of its traditional scope in this century is no less than an attempt to

247
248

Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.

249Liebman, supra note 2, at 2076 (stating: "Yet the outcome of the case - approving
an apparently mob-terrorized jury's conviction and condemnation of a Jewish man for raping and
murdering a young Christian woman - led Chief Judge Oakes recently to call Frank one of the
Courfs great failures of nerve, dn a par with DredScott and Plessy." (citing the Violent Crime
Control Act of 1991, Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 312
(1991) (testimony of Chief Judge Oakes)).

426

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XIV

surreptitiously accomplish that which would never be countenanced in a
democratic society if attempted directly. This attack constitutes a
rearguard assault via the Great Writ on modem notions of fairness as
ensconced in the due process clause.
Even the fact that a gross injustice was done in Frankv. Mangum
is not conclusive; a single injustice does not prove what the rule of law
should be. However, state courts continue to send innocent people to
death row. Randall Adam's case from Texas (immortalized in the movie
The Thin Blue Line) the McMillan case from Alabama, and Earl
Washington's25° travails in Virginia are but a few of the more publicized
death row innocents in recent years. Leo Frank was not simply an old and
isolated instance of state judicial injustice. The need for habeas corpus as
a check on state judicial institutions remains forceful, particularly in death
row cases.

' '

Justice Holmes' dissent in Frank v. Mangum, joined by Justice
Hughes, is probably more often cited, than is the majority opinion; the
Great Dissenter was at his best in turning a quotable phrase:
But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the
very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside,
not in subordination to the proceedings, and although
every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell."'
Holmes continued his broadside against the majority opinion: "Mob law
does not become due process of law by securing the assent of a terrorized
jury."2 Thus, both the majority and the dissent sketched broadly the
scope of habeas corpus. They differed only on the ambit of due process.
Holmes in dissent was not far different from the majority when he wrote

..
0 Alan Clarke, ProceduralLabyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of
Death PenaltyHabeas Corpus (PartTwo) 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 303 (1996) (discussing the three
cases in greater detail).
251Frank,237 U.S. at 346.
25
Id.at 347.
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that "a writ of habeas corpus... secure[s] fundamental rights." 253 This
dissent takes on greater importance than would otherwise be the case
because eight years later in a nearly identical base - Moore v. Dempsey,254
Justice Holmes commanded a majority that arguably overruled Frankv.
Mangum sub silentio.
"'Some of the most serious riots ...in the history of the nation

occurred from 1919 to 1922."' 255 Twenty major race riots occurred in
cities both North and South in 1919. In some areas, such as Elaine,
Arkansas, the conflict resembled a pogrom; in Chicago the disturbance has
been characterized as a race war.256 Moore v. Dempsey "came as a result
of an alleged negro 'insurrection' near Elaine, Phillips County,
'
Arkansas."2 57
This 'insurrection' apparently began when "a number of

colored people assembled in their church were attacked and fired upon by
a body of white men, and in the disturbance that followed a white man was
killed."" 8 During the ensuing disturbances five white people were killed.
Estimates of black dead range from eleven to one hundred. 59
The all White Grand Jury "indicted one hundred and twenty
negroes." 2 ° Eleven were immediately tried and sentenced to death. One
other was sentenced to death two weeks later (as soon as he was
apprehended). Fifty-four received prison sentences.26' Six of the twelve
death sentenced black men were discharged after several flawed trials
were reversed and the time for trying them expired. They were taken to
the penitentiary anyway, but lacking a court order the warden refused to

253Id. at 348.
254
255

261 U.S. 86 (1923).
J. S. Waterman & E. E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 18 ST.

Louis L. REv. 117 n.6 (1932-33) (citing THE NEGRO YEAR BOOK 73 (1922)).
256
CHARLEs REAGAN WILSON & WILLIAM FERRIS, Race Riots, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
SouTHERN CuLTuRE 1497-98 (1989).
257Waterman & Overton, supra note 255, at 117.
258Moore, 261

U.S. at 87.
2'9
Waterman & Overton, supranote 255, at 117.
260
Id.at 117.
261

1d. at 118.
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'
The other six
admit them and they then "wandered off unmolested."262
condemned men lost all direct appeals, but ultimately received
redress on
26
a writ of habeas corpus on appeal in the Supreme Court.
The -issue presented was nearly identical to the issue in Frankv.
Mangum. This time the mob dominated proceedings were held to violate
due process of law. Justice Holmes found a violation of due process
despite an appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas which answered the
' by stating that "it could not say
objection "that no fair trial could be had"264
'that this must necessarily have been the case'; that eminent counsel was
appointed to defend the petitioners, that the trial was had according to law,
the jury correctly charged, and the testimony legally sufficient."265 The
only distinction between the two cases - that the Arkansas Supreme Court
devoted less attention to the allegations of mob domination than did the
Georgia Supreme Court in Leo Frank!s case - does not seem to have
played a pivotal role inJustice Holmes' reasoning. *The Court, while
quoting some of the language of Frank .v. Mangum, proceeded to
eviscerate the central theme of that case. The state's corrective process
becomes something quite different in Justice Holmes' facile hands. Even
appellate review as a corrective process would not necessarily cure a trial
tainted by mob domination:

We assume in accordance with [Frankv. Mangum] that
the corrective process supplied by the State may be so
adequate that interference by habeas corpus ought not to;
be allowed. It certainly is true that mere mistakes of law
in the course of a trial are not to be corrected in that way.
But ifthe case is that the whole proceeding is a mask--that
counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an
262

1d. at 119.

263Apparently six cases went up on appeal, but the Supreme Court "overlooked the

appeal of Frank Hicks when it referred to only five petitioners. Court records show that the
mandate of the United States Supreme Court, sent to the federal district court in Arkansas on
April 11, 1923, included Frank Hicks as well as the other five petitioners." Id. at 125 n.55.
2 261 U.S. at91.
265Id.
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irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State
Courtsfailed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in
the machinery for correction nor the possibility that the
trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an
immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court
from securing
to the petitioners their constitutional
6
rights.

26

Notice the difference. In Frank v. Mangum, the state court's appellate
corrective process sufficed to meet all due process requirements, and the
federal habeas court could not thereafter inquire into the factual predicates
of petitioner's claim. Here, the state courts must "correct the wrong"
created by mob domination, not just afford the appearance of having done
so. Thus, in this case, unlike Leo Frank's case, the matter was remanded
to the local federal district court for a factual determination on the merits
of petitioner's claim. Those who construe habeas narrowly deny this
distinction between these cases, but in so doing they distort Justice
Holmes' language.
Justice Holmes does not discuss the scope of habeas corpus except
as it interrelates with due process of law. Due process remains his primary
concem. To read this case as a limitation on the scope of habeas twists the
tenor of the language used. Furthermore, although the case does not
explicitly overrule Frankv. Mangum, the dissent, sees what has happened.
It treats the case as having been overruled:
InFrankv. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 325, 326, 327,.329,
335, after great' consideration a majority of this Court
approved the doctrine which should be applied here. The
doctrine is right and wholesome. I can not agree now to
put it aside, and substitute the views expressed by the
minority of the Court in that cause.267

Id. (emphasis added).

161

267Id. at 93 (Justice McReynolds and Justice Sutherland, dissenting).
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Thus, Moore v. Dempsey reaffirms habeas corpus's broad scope as a
remedy for due process violations while it simultaneously broadened due
process conceptions.
The six condemned men were never retried. The county was
liable to the state for the boarding of death row prisoners and it had
become too expensive to retry the case.26 The Governor and defense
counsel worked out an agreement commuting the death sentences, and
ultimately the "governor granted them indefinite furloughs,"2 69 which "have
never been revoked."27 Subsequent cases confirm that the focus of the
Supreme Court's attention was the scope of due process, not the remedial
scope of habeas corpus. Mooney v. Holohan271 in 1935 demonstrates this.
Thomas Mooney sought leave to file an original writ of habeas corpus in
the United States Supreme Court,272 alleging that the prosecution had
secured his conviction by knowingly using perjured testimony.273 The
California Attorney General demurred arguing that even if the allegations
were true 'that the acts or omissions of a prosecuting attorney can [never],
in and by themselves, amount ...to a denial of due process of law."274

The Supreme Court found itself "unable to approve this narrow view of
the requirement of due process."2 75 However, because petitioner had not
first availed himself of state habeas, which appeared to be available, the
Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice to refile once he had
travelled through available state procedures. The court asserted:
Orderly procedure, governed by principles we have
repeatedly announced, requires that before this Court is
asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus, in the case of a
person held under a state commitment, recourse should
.6 Waternan & Overton, supra note 255, at 123-24.
269
Id.at 123.

270
id.
271294 U.S. 103 (1935).
7

1 1 Id. at
273

109.

1d. at 110.

274Id. at

75

1

111-12.
1d. at 112.
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be had to whatever judicial remedy afforded by the State
may still remain open.276
This, then, is a very modem conception of both habeas corpus and due
process. If petitioner can prove her claim she has a viable due process
violation. She is required, by the rule of exhaustion, to first submit to any
available state corrective processes, but she is not thereby foreclosed from
later instituting a federal proceeding. There is no hint that the federal
habeas court would be limited, as Professor Bator argues, to determining
whether the state hearing provided an adequate corrective process. The
federal habeas court will, after the issue is exhausted in the state courts
have the power to entertain the issue on habeas corpus and to determine
the facts and law as may be necessary.
Similarly, in Whaley v. Johnston,2" which involved allegations that
petitioner's guilty plea had been coerced, the Supreme Court said:
In such circumstances the use of the writ in the federal
courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for
crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment
of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial
court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is
the only effective means of preserving his rights.278
The case was remanded for factual development by the federal district
court with the direction that:
If the allegations are found to be true, petitioner's
constitutional rights were infringed. For a conviction on

276

Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
.7316 U.S. 101 (1942).
27 8
Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted).
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a plea of guilty coerced by a federal law enforcement
officer is no more consistent with due process than a
conviction supported by a coerced confession.2 79

The Whaley Court used the "no jurisdiction" language, as had
Lange, Siebold, Yick Wo, Snow, and Nielsen in the past century; but now
it explicitly abandoned jurisdictional fiction and applied to "exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of ...constitutional

rights".28 The only difference seems to be that over time the Court's
language in applying habeas corpus to tle denial of constitutional rights
became increasingly specific. To read into that evolving specificity a root
change in the scope of habeas corpus (at least since the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867) is to mistake evolution of the substantive law as constituting
change in procedural law.
Professor Bator argues that "[t]he decisions of the three decades
following Frank,Moore, and Mooney did not produce major changes in
the general principles of the habeas jurisdiction."281 Because Bator fails to
see that the change was already wrought in the late 19th and early 20th
century, culminating inMoore he misreads these cases. He views them as
limiting federal habeas jurisdiction to the review of state criminal cases
only when the state failed to supply any corrective mechanism. Bator reads
the per curiam Whaley decision as providing a remedy only where there
is no effective state mechanism in place. In support he quotes the Whaley
language stating that the writ "extends also to those exceptional cases
where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of
the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means ofpreserving
his rights."282 This is a very cramped interpretation of this language, and
quite unfaithful to what the Supreme Court appears to have been doing in
these cases.
279

Id.at 104 (citations omitted).

28

Id. at 105.
supra note 3, at 493.
282
Id.at 495 (quoting Whaley, 316 U.S. at 105).
291Bator,
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Brown v. Allen,283 in 1953, states:

.... the prior State determination of a claim under the
United States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration
of such a claim, else the State court would have the final
say which the Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it
should not have.284
For Bator Brown constituted a profound and dubious change in the law.285
The Court is saying that the federal habeas court does have the power to
determine the factual predicates of alleged constitutional violations arising
out of the state criminal process. Contrary to Bator, however, this is not
new. The federal habeas courts had this power at least since Moore. On
2 86
the other hand, Professor Liebman argues that Brown "is anticlimax."
Far from constituting a sea change, the case merely modernized the
language of the law. The changes since Brown have been momentous;
however, they and the changes wrought by them are beyond the scope of
this historical essay.287

III. CONCLUSION
The history of habeas corpus remains important. It explains the
modem controversies which continue to be debated in the courts, and in
academia. Those who would eviscerate modem habeas corpus rely on a

283344
8

U.S. 443 (1953).

Id. at 500.

285Bator, supra note 3, at 500.
286Liebman, supra note 2, at 2083.
287For a full exposition of modern habeas corpus law see, Alan Clarke, Procedural

Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part
One), 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1327 (1995) and Alan Clarke, ProceduralLabyrinths and the
Injustice of Death:A Critiquesof Death Penalty HabeasCorpus (PartTwo), 30 U. RICH. L.
REv. 303 (1996). These papers carry the history forward and argue that the restrictive doctrines
enunciated by the Rehnquist Court have since eviscerated the Great Writ..
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distorted view of that history to buttress their case. The debate should be
on the merits, and should not be predicated upon a flawed historical
analysis.

